Desire for Origin / Original Desire by Gauthier, Lorraine
LoRRAINE GAUTHIER teaches in and is co-ordinator of the bilingual Women's
Studies programme at Glendon College, York University. This article forms a
part of a project in which the author intends to present to anglo-feminists a detailed
analysis of Luce lrigaray's views on language, sexuality and motherhood.
Desire for Origin / Original
Desire:
Luce Irigaray on Maternity, Sexuality and Language
LORRAINE GAUTHIER
FRENCH "FEMINIST" THEORISTS of. "diff trence" focus on the relationship
of the sexed body to symbolic discourse. Luce Irigaray's contribution
addresses the projection of men's psycho-sexual relation to the "mother's
body" and the specificity of the woman's "sexual body". Both of these bo-
dies occupy an important position in the ubiquitous metaphors which
form the basis of our language systems. Irigaray argues that this relation-
ship between the sexed body and language is essential to the construction
of symbolic discourse per se, and is, as well, the very "source" of our op-
pression, the main "site" of our subjugation. She raises two fundamental
questions: what is the relationship between the physiological and the
symbolic, between the body and language; what place do women as
mothers occupy within this relationship, and by extension, what effect
does this place have on women as women within our society?
For Luce lrigaray, philosophy is the basis of all discourse, including
psychoanalytic discourse, whose privileged object is the analysis of the
"subject" and of human sexuality. A major portion of her work analyses
traditional philosophy, from Plato to Derrida, by using psychoanalytic
concepts of repression and repetition and deconstructive notions of the
metaphoricity of all discourse. Irigaray exposes the desire for origin, for
symmetry, for unity, for solidity and for the visible which underlies "phal-
lomorphic" discourse. These exclude the very possibility of any other
discourse, any other relationship to "others" and to the "world" unless
that "other" is inscribed as opposite, negative, or mirror image. The de-
sire for origin, for the mother, for the intra-uterine existence which has
been lost refuses to grant this "origin" a desire of its own, or to see those
whose bodies are identifiable with that "origin" as being other than the
mothers, in an endless repetition, retrieval, repression. Obliterated is the
symbolic representation of women as women, as well as the relationship
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between morhers and daughters, rhe black continent within the brack con-
tinent, as Irigaray so aptly describes it.
The question of the repression of our origin, of our birth, of our physical
relationship with our mother's sexed body and of the impact of this repres-
sion on sexual difference is perhaps, as she suggests, the major issue which
our era is addressing. Attempts ar gerting to the origin of the question, to
the question of origin, have too often floundered in an unrecognized meta-
phoricity of language in which men's projecrions still predominate. The
two most recent "subversive" thinkers of our times, who have attempted to
deconstruct and decentre the subject, are themselves caught within their
own web of repressed desire and their own metaphoricity of identity, form,
solidity and visibility. Both Derrida's literal trace and Lacan's mirror
image presume the solidity of surface, a solid supporr, and privilege the
scopic which distances the letter and the image from the eye which sees but
never touches. Neither the trace nor the image can be produced without si-
multaneously reproducing, hence neither has origin, only effect. Derrida
and Lacan repudiate the very notion of origin within their theoretical
"scope". Derrida rejects, and as Irigaray would have it, represses the "logos',
as original voiced presence. For Lacan, origin is the very lackoforigin, the
"manque" as primary division, as gap, as "l'hommelet" (placenta), lost
and discarded. But for Irigaray either affirming or denying rranscendenral
origin comes to the same repression, that of the physical relationship to
the mother's body.
The repression of the mother's sexed body is not, as Lacan, Kristeva and
others would have it, a necessity for the entrance into the symbolic, but
rather, in Irigarean terms, the impediment to the very possibility of any
real symbolic and sexual exchange. What is repressed along with the
mother's sexed body is sexual difference and specifity. This is not, she
asserts, a mere reduction to anatomical difference. Rather than oppose the
biological determinism of Freud's "anaromy is destiny" by privileging
the social construction of sexed categories, Irigaray is attempting to un-
cover the relationship which male dominated discourses have continuous-
ly denied: the intricate relationship between woman's body and language
and the irreducible "diff6rence" of rhe female body and experience which
cannot be expressed as a mere difference "from" any one particular privi-
leged signifier, i.e. the phallus.
The issue for Irigaray is not only ro retrieve corporeality. It is especially
a question of recognizing the difference in differenrly sexed bodies and the
role of that difference and its repression in the elaboration of the metaphors
which underlie our sexual symbolic representations. she wishes to unmask
the myth of "language" as neutral, a neutraliry which in effect is mascu-
line, and, unrecognized as such, is presented as universal in opposition to
the "specificity" of female language. This supposedly neutral language,
linked to male physiology, devalues or excludes the multiplicity, fluidity
and flux of female experience which finds itself unrepresenred. and un-
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representable. For Irigaray, both sexes speak a "specific" language, each
from the position of "other". It is only when this is recognized thateach
will be able to speak to the other. For this to happen women must be
allowed to develop our language, our symbols with which to express our
"selves", our experience, and in such expression discover ourselves as true
other, as women, not as "other" to the one.
The same philosophical and linguistic mdconnaissance lies at the base
of prevailing psychoanalytic theory. It proves to be yet one more specula-
tion, specularisation of male desire in which women can never become
women but must always be either men, "la petite fille est alors un petit
homme" , or mothers, " le bonheur coniugal restant mal assurt tant que la
femme n'a pas reussi d laire de son 6poux son enfant"t This latter is our
only feminine role which we must fulfill by being "like amother" (comme
la mdre), like our mother, like his mother, with whom we nevertheless do
not icientify. It is the "place" of motherhood to which we aspire, a place
now filled by one whom we have learnt to devalue and whoni we must oust
from place in order to occupy it ourselves. Hate and rivalry, not love and
identification are the results, with devastating effects on both women and
mothers. Women never achieve the status of "sexed" being, are always re-
duced to a sexless reproductive womb. As idealized mothers our genitalia
are veiled with denial or when represented, as in pornography, are so as
effect of this denial which reduces them to insatiable holes to be violently
subjugated. This violation masks the threat of uterine reabsorption and
hence of annihilation experienced by men's unconscious and unanalysed
desire for origin.
Irigaray attempts to reanalyse the construction of the sexed subject with-
in the patriarchal triadic family. Her starting point is Freud's theory of the
oedipal complex and Lacan's notions of the mirror phase and the
"nom/non du pire" as the separation of the mother,/child dyad which in-
duces the child's individuation and entrance into the symbolic. What is
excluded from these concepts is the mother daughter relationship, since
within the paradigm of psychoanalytic theory itself, a woman's relation-
ship to her origin is obliterated from the very beginning, in the necessity
for her to turn against the mother and form a relationship with the father.
This rejection of the mother is constructed and rnaintained by masculine
l. "the little girl is then a little man" and "a marriage is not made secure
until the wife has succeeded in making her husband her child as well'"
quoted from Freud's "Feminity" in Luce Irigaray's Speculum de I'autre
lemme (Paris: Minuit, 1974), p. 26, and Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris:
Minuit, 1977), p. 42.
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discourse which has symbolically represenred men's relationship to origin
as the only relationship possible. opposing Kristeva's norion that both
sexes have a relationship to the semiotic pre-oedipal language, Irigaray
points out that women are denied access because the dominant discourse
offers us no language, no means of symbolisaton with which to trace our
way back. our inability to articulate our repressed semiotic eiemenrs pro-
duces in us hysterical somatic symptoms, or leads us to excessive identifi-
cation with phallic discourse and power, as an extension of our identifica-
tion with the father.
The repression of origin, of desire for origin is also a repression of our
original desire and hence of all desire. wcmen's sexual specificity has no
symbolic representation through which women as sexual beings can iden-
tify with other women in a validaring non-maternal role. women's fluidity,
flux and multiplicity, which lie at the base of our bodily experience of rhe
"other" and of the "world", are inexpressible since the patriarchal family
and phallic discourse offer bur one symbol with which women can have
but a negative relationship. what is needed according to Irigaray is a move-
ment from infant individuation from the mother, to retrieval of the mother,
to beyond the mother towards the woman, a movement with symbolic
representations specifically reflecting women's experience. we must find
our way back to our mothers via the creation of female goddesses (not ferti-
lity figures) whose exisrence would give us a symbolic language through
which we can return to our origin, in order to go beyond. Otherwise wom-
en's perpetual exile from our primary maternal territory, our fundamen-
tal privation which Kristeva suggesrs may in fact be our castration, will
forever block our full entrance inro the symbolic.
The beyond, however, seems difficult to envisage and to theorize without
falling back into the negation./repression which Irigaray exposes as the
basis of male discourse. she insists that we cannot relate to. nor love. the
other without first relating to and loving the same (la m6me). yet she
speaks of the need for women to mourn their mothers, in order to recognize
and relate to the women who have, so far, been veiled by the term and. the
role of "mother". As opposed to melancholia, where part of the ego has
identified with the object from whom libidinal auachmenr must be with-
drawn, mourning is the slow process by which the libido successfully
detaches itself from one object onto another. As such, mourning could
complete the infantile movement away from the mother which necessitat-
ed a negation of her as same, a construction of her, as "Other". It is this
need for negation of identity, of sameness, which poses the problem. Our
mothers, as original love-object, can never be totally abandoned. As in me-
lancholia, it is not so much a question of "whom" we have lost, but of
"what" we have lost in the loss of the loved object (the mother)z With the
2. sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", in General psychologi-
cal Theory (New York: Collier, l97a), p. 166.
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added burden of a problematic identification with our mothers, how do we
navigate between mourning and negation without the former flowing in-
extricably into the latter? Can we as women be any more successful at
mourning that loss than men have been, granted that our loss is different?
What is repressed in her demand for a validating symbolisation of wo-
men which plays down if not bypasses our roles as mothers? Is she not run-
ning the risk of once more repressing the mother as original desire? It is our
desire for origin,/original desire which has been repressed by male discour-
se and which needs symbolic representation. Can this desire of ours for our
origin be expressed through a symbolic denial of women as mother? Does
our origin as women lie elsewhere than in our mothers? Are we not delud-
ing ourselves if we attempt to represent ourselves symbolically as women
without re-presenting our origin, if we attempt to go beyond the mother to
the woman who hides "behind", and on to our selves? Would this not end
up granting a monopoly to men's representations of the mother, and in-
deed, would our denial not reinforce their negation? In fact, can we side-
step our mothers, the mother in us, on our way to the women in them, to
the woman in us? This woman beyond the mother may be unreachable, if
not inexistent, for as long as we are "of woman born".
Perhaps we must break more radically with the devaluation of our
mothers, of us as daughters to a mother, upon which the theory of the
phallus has insisted. Irigaray implies as much in her emphasis on the
role of desire for origin,/original desire both in men's symbolicprojections
and for the liberation of the repressed in women. This is an emphasis
which is belied in her explicit insistence on the symbolic validation of
women as women and on the need to go beyond the mother. Yet the meta-
phorical slippages in her two essays "L'une ne bouge pas sans I'autre" and
"Quand nos ldvres se parlent" bind maternity and women's sexuality to
such an extent that each essay, though presumably concentrating on one or
the other, can be read as referring to both motherhood and sexuality. Both
the inability for autonomous movement and the communication between
our lips refer to mother,/daughter relationships and to the female genitalia
whose labia (lips) are so central to Irigaray's discussion of female sexuality.
These essays are a clear indication of how difficult it is to separate our re-
lationship to our bodies and to other women from our maternal ties, re-
pressed or not.
But this is no mere oversight on her part. For Irigaray, the collapsing of
woman into mother is itself a phallic reduction, necessitated by the male
desire for origin,/original desire. It all but obliterates woman as an auto-
nomous sexual being whose sexuality, when broached, is discussed in
phallic terms, not in terms of our own experience and potentialities which
she wishes to unearth from centuries of male projections and denials. She
decries the role assigned to women as the social unconscious of male de-
sire. Would the unconscious be the same in a non-phallic society she asks?
She insists that it has always been and continues to be a question of the
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outright suppression of women's bodies, of the mother's sexed body be-
neath the image of the castrated mother, occulted in her sexual neutrality.
For her, if there has been any social necessity, it has been the need for this
repression in order to constitute and maintain phallomorphic discourse.
Hence her insistence on the creation of symbols more pertinent to female
experience and specifically to women as women.
Can we avoid this phallic reduction of women as mothers by recognizing
mothers as women, as sexed beings, without separating the two? There, of
course, lies the crux of the problem. As she has so aptly demonstrated, men
have been unable to do so and have separated motherhood and sexed
womanhood, denying sexuality to the first and materniry ro the second.
Must we maintain that separation while merely affirming in a specific and
positive way the sexuality of women? Is it merely a quesrion of oppression,
or are we not facing a perhaps insoluble and inevitable repression? The
distinction between the two is sometimes lost in our attempt to recapture
what men have so brutally negated.
Julia Kristeva's analysis of the semiotic gives us some sense of the
strength of the psychoanalytic and physical bonds with the mother, though
her prescription that women's role in society be a negative one, in which
women constantly expose the gaps in masculinist symbolic discourse,
leaves little for women to do as positive agents of our liberation. However,
her analysis of the necessity to break the intimate bodily semiotic links
with the mother, in order to enter symbolic discourse, must be carefully
examined in order to address the complex problem of the seemingly in-
surmountable love,/hate, desire,/rejection of the mother as mother. Irigaray
has criticized this break as the site of women's oppresion and repression
within a phallic order. Can we go beyond this and theorize a non-phallic
break in our intimate relationship with our mothers or must we reformu-
late the entire question of this break, of this creation of orher, of Other?
It is not merely a question of going beyond the mother but of retrieving
her and keeping her with us in a manner that allows both her and us to be
same and other. As Irigaray claims, women are never just one, they are
always at least two: mother (potential or real) and women (potential or
real). Does the difficulty not lie in our inability ro separare ourselves in
two? Can the same not be said of our oppression? If exile from our primary
maternal territory is our castration, then this denial of our desire for ori-
gin/original desire is also a denial of desire itself and of the language
which mediates between the two. Symbolic representations of our mothers
as sexed beings, as women of desire may be the means of assuring identity
and otherness for both of us in order to liberate our desire, our selves. For
as Irigaray clearly points out in "L'une ne bouge pas sans I'autre", the
mother is as enmeshed in her desire for, identification with and separation
from the child as is the child with her. The symbolisation of women as wo-
men may not untangle this web of desire and identification and by produc-
ing yet another mother,/woman split may repeat and reinforce the virgin-
mother./whore split of phallic discourse.
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